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Rothstein: Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations

This book provides the perspectives
and experiences of social scientists who,
embedded with military teams, shared
their knowledge and cultural expertise
to help military leaders make informed
decisions within culturally diverse
environments. This volume will prove
to be an invaluable resource for military
leaders, as it highlights the importance
and impact of understanding the role
of cultural diversity in military operations. McFate and Laurence have
performed a service to the military by
providing a valuable resource for all
military leaders to guide them in future
military operations. In addition, this
book applauds those scientists who were
daring enough to join in the human
terrain effort and share their experiences
with us. The ability to achieve cultural
competence must be viewed as a warfighting imperative and as a prerequisite for all future military leaders. This
volume is informative and inspiring—a
must-read for all those interested in
the cultural and human dimensions
of multinational warfare. The detailed
bibliography provides recommendations for further reading to enhance
the reader’s knowledge of this topic.
YVONNE R. MASAKOWSKI

Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special
Operations Command, by Sean Naylor. New York:
St. Martin’s, 2015. 560 pages. $29.99 (paperback
$17.99, Kindle $14.99).

Once again, Sean Naylor has produced
an authoritative and well-written book.
Relentless Strike chronicles the history
of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), America’s top-tier special
operations military unit. To the benefit
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of history and the reader, and most likely
to the consternation of the Pentagon,
Naylor’s knowledge of special operations
and his extensive contacts reveal the
temperaments and competencies of key
individuals and the details of numerous
clandestine missions and organizational
capabilities. Many will condemn Naylor
for revealing these secrets, but the
fault is not with Naylor; it is with those
who talked. The book also, perhaps
unintentionally, exposes flaws in how
the United States wages war, as well as
the limitations of special operations.
The book begins by recounting the
creation of JSOC after the failed Iranian
hostage rescue operation in 1980. New
threats to national security required a
new military organization that had the
resources and capabilities to respond
quickly to crises and apply specialized military capabilities to rescue
hostages, kill terrorists, and neutralize
weapons of mass destruction. Naylor
reminds us that senior military leaders opposed the new command, but
the failure in Iran trumped parochial
thinking. The second and more interesting part of the book addresses the
expansion of JSOC as one result of the
momentous impact of the 9/11 attacks.
From the beginning, JSOC had significant advantages over both conventional
military organizations and nonaffiliated special operations units. The units
placed under JSOC’s direct control were
the best-trained and best-resourced
units in the military. Each of these
units had its own sophisticated—and
grueling—selection process. Remarkably, JSOC headquarters had nothing
that mirrored such careful processes
for selecting its staff. Also oddly, the
Pentagon had no process for selecting
a JSOC commander whose experience
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and temperament matched the requirements of a national force. To be sure,
some of JSOC’s early commanders were
excellent—but that was the exception.
This deficiency became clear in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
The 1980s and ’90s were a period of
steady growth in terms of structure,
budget, and formalized relationships
throughout the interagency world. JSOC
was required to be ready to launch a
task force within four hours for a variety
of missions of national importance.
Although specific mission requirements ultimately would dictate the task
force’s composition, significant mission
“enablers” from inside the Defense Department and external to it always had
to be on standby. It required dedication
of a dozen Air Force transport aircraft
to deploy the JSOC staff, operators,
helicopters, ground-assault vehicles,
and other necessary equipment for
initial operations. This initial package
often would encompass five hundred
people, and more people and equipment
frequently would follow. Additionally, being ready for every contingency
required JSOC to have a comprehensive liaison network throughout many
government agencies, especially the
Intelligence Community. This formulaic
approach to every mission resulted in
a large task force being deployed for
almost every problem. As a result, JSOC
unintentionally undermined its ability to
deploy clandestinely and remain agile.
During this time frame, JSOC deployed
to war alongside conventional forces in
Panama and during Operation DESERT
STORM. It also deployed in response
to the hijacking of the Italian cruise
ship Achille Lauro, which had eighteen
Americans aboard, and to Somalia in
1993 in what would become the “Black
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Hawk Down” debacle. Other, lessknown operations took place as well.
The results of JSOC’s work before 9/11
were mixed, at best. While the quality of operators in JSOC’s subordinate
units was superb, the JSOC command
and staff—and “Washington”—often
underperformed. Some of these deficiencies would be addressed after 9/11.
The 9/11 attacks produced a sense of
vulnerability for Americans. They also
created a need to respond quickly with
force against those directly and indirectly responsible. No one was more
frustrated by the military’s inability to
strike back quickly than Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense. Rumsfeld
looked to General Charles Holland,
commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), for a
plan. He was bitterly disappointed: Holland was unprepared, and therefore was
reluctant to seize the opportunity to take
the war to America’s enemies. However,
JSOC’s reputation, built in part by its
extensive liaison network in Washington
and its sophisticated exercise program,
now grabbed Rumsfeld’s attention. JSOC
easily was able to sell its unique capabilities to an anxious buyer. JSOC’s boundless self-confidence would lead to an
expanded role, because the administration in Washington desperately needed
to go after Al Qaeda and its supporters.
Although JSOC was a subordinate command of USSOCOM, General Holland
was happy to stay on the sidelines. JSOC
would become “almost an independent
military force for Rumsfeld,” under
the command of Major General Dell
Dailey. Everything seemed to be in place
for JSOC to destroy those responsible
for the 9/11 attacks. The leadership in
Washington empowered JSOC to do
whatever was necessary. The superbly
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trained operators were anxious to make
Bin Laden and his lieutenants pay with
their lives for their actions. But, for the
second time, a leadership deficiency on
the part of a senior commander hampered JSOC. General Holland, and now
Major General Dailey, both aviators, did
not have what was necessary to unleash
JSOC’s special operations capabilities.
Both were conservative, conventional
thinkers unable to adapt to a new type of
warfare. The triad necessary for successful action had two elements in hand—
Washington sponsorship and competent
operators—but still lacked a key element: a proper JSOC commander. Major
General Stanley McChrystal would fix
this shortcoming, and with gusto.
McChrystal commanded JSOC for
almost five years, transforming it into
a killing machine in Iraq, Afghanistan,
and beyond. To McChrystal and many
in Washington, JSOC was the “nation’s
main effort in the war on terror.” He was
in charge of a global enterprise, but the
enterprise needed better intelligence and
a better scheme to respond rapidly to
that intelligence. JSOC would expand its
liaison network within the Intelligence
Community and to other organizations
operating in the region. Capturing and
interrogating enemy operatives now
would be preferred to killing them.
JSOC began running agent networks as
well as putting its own operators on the
ground, even in places such as Bengha
zi, to develop situational awareness.
JSOC also demanded extensive aerial
reconnaissance assets. Likewise, war in
the information age pushed JSOC to
develop a cyber capability to hack into
social media and cell phone communications. Then JSOC’s subordinate
units needed to retool to respond to the
growing clarity about the disposition
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of the enemy networks that the intelligence process was producing.
General McChrystal’s force of personality fused all these disparate parts of
the enormous intelligence apparatus
together. Retooling Delta Force, the
Rangers, and SEAL Team 6 was relatively easy; the troops instinctively knew
they needed to operate in small teams
and in unorthodox ways to defeat enemy
networks. They welcomed McChrystal’s aggressiveness and willingness to
take risks. The war was an obsession
for the JSOC commander. It became
McChrystal’s life, and he wanted his
men to understand that the war, and
nothing else, should be their life too. His
single-minded determination was infectious to some and repellent to others.
The JSOC commander had perfected a
process that became known as F3EAD
(“Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze,
Disseminate”), and the JSOC operations center was called the “Death Star.”
“Strike to develop” intelligence became
the task force catchphrase. McChrystal
had perfected the F3EAD machine, and
the process had become self-sustaining.
Naylor claims that in the U.S. military’s
darkest days in Iraq, JSOC was the only
American force achieving success. This
depends on how you measure success,
especially in light of the contemporary
situation in both Iraq and Afghanistan.
Under McChrystal’s leadership, JSOC’s
operators efficiently and effectively
found, fixed, and captured or killed
high- and midvalue targets and anyone
else they deemed appropriate. Often
they fought their war disconnected
from other U.S. and coalition forces
that were fighting the same war. JSOC’s
size, an issue in the 1980s and 1990s,
grew from about eight hundred to
more than 2,300 in 2008, not including
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a six-hundred-man JSOC intelligence
brigade added in late 2008. JSOC demanded and received a disproportionate
share of assets, including taking control
of other military units not only when
necessary but when convenient—to the
dismay of commanders also charged
with fighting the war. But JSOC did
kill Zarqawi and Bin Laden and many,
many other very bad people. Leaders in
Washington declared, “JSOC is awesome.” Our enemies needed killing, and
no military unit did it better than JSOC.
Naylor tells us that before 9/11 several
key figures described JSOC as “a Ferrari in the garage.” General McChrystal, with the full support of leaders in
Washington, took the Ferrari out of the
garage and created a killing machine
whose performance was unparalleled.
Unfortunately, a discerning reader
easily could conclude that the Ferrari actually was still on the same road
as the rest of the U.S. military—and
that road would lead to nowhere.
HY S. ROTHSTEIN

Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War, by P.
W. Singer and August Cole. New York: Houghton
Mifflin, 2015. 416 pages. $28 (paperback $14.95,
Kindle $9.99).

No author today will argue with Samuel
Taylor Coleridge’s perspective that any
work of fiction requires the reader
to engage in a willing suspension of
disbelief. The wording of the concept
is important because it goes beyond
the idea of a reader just pushing the “I
believe” button. The concept requires
the reader to be an active participant:
he or she must willingly enter a world
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known to be false. It is the job of the
author to maintain that world, to hold
the reader suspended throughout the
entire book, and to prevent him or
her from falling out of the fictional
world with an ungraceful “whump.”
For the author of a techno-thriller,
holding the reader suspended in this
alternate reality requires even more
finesse than for other types of fiction. The world of a techno-thriller is
relatively close to the world in which the
reader lives. Both the technology and
the environment of the story are set in a
future near enough that all the governmental and organizational structures,
global and domestic relationships, and
technical capabilities showcased in the
story must be close enough to what the
reader knows today to be believable.
This is the challenge P. W. Singer and
August Cole set for themselves in Ghost
Fleet. It is a herculean task. The international backdrop today is far different
from that of the techno-thriller heyday
of the 1980s and early 1990s. The U.S.
cultural setting of Red Storm Rising,
published in 1986, was influenced by
forty years of the Cold War. Dominated
by baby boomers and gen Xers, the
general population of the United States
during that time had limited access to
international news and perspectives,
had grown up with the threat of nuclear
war, and had been indoctrinated with
the ideological vilification of Communism. Today the cultural backdrop
for the U.S. population is as mixed
and varied as the people themselves.
International news and perspectives are
available to anyone, quite literally at the
touch of a finger; the threat of nuclear
war has been replaced with a threat of
terrorism; and ideological vilification
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